In a short essay called “The Absurd” philosopher Thomas Nagel argues that the seriousness with which we take our own lives is readily contrasted with a point-of-view available to human beings from which “we see ourselves from the outside.” The contrast between the first-person perception of the importance of our individual lives and the detached observation of its apparent futility leads to doubt about the point of anything. Though we may try to escape this view by seeking more “ultimate concerns,” doubt cannot be eradicated.

We cannot help but take our own lives seriously. “We pursue our lives….” This earnestness is basic to human nature. But we doubt that there is a point. The doubt is a direct result of our peculiar ability to see ourselves from outside. (I can’t help thinking of Heidegger on this point: Dasein is that entity where its Being is an issue to itself). Once doubt enters the picture, we are left dangling.

Nagel compares this existential doubt to epistemological skepticism. Once I’ve made the skeptical move (I may be dreaming) I will necessarily conclude that the most basic foundation of my knowledge is subject to doubt. But, as he points out, we don’t typically become psychologically paralyzed by this idea. Instead he says:

“Philosophical skepticism does not cause us to abandon our ordinary beliefs, but it lends them a peculiar flavor. After acknowledging that their truth is incompatible with possibilities that we have no grounds for believing do not obtain–apart from grounds in those very beliefs which we have called into question–we return to our familiar convictions with a certain sense of irony and resignation.”

Nagel’s view that a sense of irony is the most appropriate response to the questions of both skepticism and absurdity is profound. Skepticism and the awareness of the absurd result “from the ability to understand our human limitations.” Irony and resignation. I can live with that.

(My copy of the essay is in an anthology called The Meaning of Life. Edited by E. D. Klemke. It was originally published in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXIII, No. 20, 1971.  Pp. 716-727).