Solipsism
- December 8th, 2010
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I am a solipsist.
That is not true. I am not a solipsist in the metaphysical sense. But there is a sense that perhaps demands a new word. The word hasn’t been coined yet, but if I think of it, I will certainly post it. My solipsism is not metaphysical, as I said. Nor is it epistemological. There is sufficient evidence for the existence of other minds, and the notion that there aren’t other minds is not credible.
However, there is another problem. While I can be comfortable in my knowledge of the existence of other minds, I am also aware of a more immediate problem: the inadequacy of that knowledge. While I am aware that other intentional creatures exist, I am at a loss as to how to interact with them. Yes, language is a wonderful innovation. Facial expressions and body language make subtle, emotional communication possible. But all of this communication is false.
The inadequacy of human communication.
Even when we try to be honest, we fail. External facts can be communicated. The utterance, “two plus two equals four” is a true statement, but it communicates nothing about the sender. So, the problem is not that true utterances are not possible, but that a true statement about oneself is impossible. All of the “facts” that can be stated about oneself — the totality of facts about oneself — even if they could be cataloged and expressed, would not reveal the truth about a person. The public fact library, if there was such a thing, about an individual would reveal nothing about the being in itself.
Even truth and falsehood as categories break down. Can I speak about a true state of my mind? That it is in such and such a neurological state? That can be shown to be true, by an observer. It is a “state of affairs” as the philosophers say. But can a truth value be ascribed to my experience? “I am in pain.” “I have a pain in my foot.”
A Wittgensteinian will argue that if there is any inadequacy, it is a limitation of language and not a fundamental problem. But there are private experiences that are inexpressable. Does an infant exist before it acquires language? Is it conscious? Is it human?
I want to avoid a philosophical argument in any event since I am not competent to conduct it. But somewhere in this is a root of anxiety, perhaps better expressed by appeal to literature than philosophy.
