There’s a theory in philosophy of art pioneered by George Dickie and fully developed by Arthur Danto that attributes art-proper status to objects in virtue of those objects’ relation to a cultural entity known as the artworld. In this view, man-made objects attain the status of art (or Art) by having that status conferred upon them by this amorphous institution. I’m not a huge fan of the theory, but it points to a more interesting phenomenon.
As I have written previously, my own skepticism about what can be known about the world precludes a rich ontology for myself. I choose not to believe in gods and spirits and so forth because I have a difficult enough time just maintaining belief in other people! But that’s just me. It is, no doubt, a peculiar character defect of my own along with some philosophers of the past with a lot more brains than I have. However, it seems clear that a lot of people–the majority of people–believe in all sorts of strange stuff.
What I am interested in about all these beliefs is whether, and in what way, these systems of beliefs, these exotic metaphysical statements, might be true. And when I say true I mean that in the usual, common sense way that people use the term. I want to make the claim that utterances such as “Jesus is the Son of God” and “There is no God but Allah and Muhammed is his prophet” are true in precisely the same way as when I say “I am a forty-four year old white male.”
I am not talking about syncretism or relativism or secret meanings behind these statements. If these statements have any meaning at all, then they must mean pretty much what they say. (Logical positivists and early Wittgenstein regarded these statements as nonsense since they did not refer to “real” objects. But they can’t be nonsense. Entire lives are devoted to understanding them, following them, etc.)
So how can they be true, particularly if such statements are contradictory and mutually exclusive?
I propose that their truth value obtains in virtue of a conferral of that status by an appropriate configuration of believers in much the same way as the institutional theory of art makes Art out of artifacts.
But why make truth value the reward for the persistence of religion? We might go along with you if you stuck to some other predicate like beauty, but not truth for God’s sake!
“Why not?” I say. What gives the idea of truth such special privilige? I say you are stuck in the same rut as the theists. You want there to be a God perspective, and you imagine yourself seated upon the celestial throne observing the entirety of the universe with perfect apprehension and from that vantage you can say, with absolute certainty, what is real and what is true.
But there is no such place. And in this world belief precedes truth. I become certain of something when I am convinced that it cannot be otherwise. Truth begins with belief not the other way around.
How are we to avoid relativism, then? (My truth, your truth, what is truth? as Pilate said). This is where I have to make an ontological move. Belief by the appropriate configuration of believers as evidenced by its persistence and effects signify the existence of true facts about the universe that demonstrate the truth of the objects of those beliefs.
It will make no difference that the facts of one belief system contradict the facts of another. The two systems are incommensurable, as are the worlds within which these facts obtain. They are alternate universes created by the persistence of belief.